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Much is being written about hermeneutics these days. Yet few books come out that deal 
with the specific questions of interpretation that confront the Indologist who studies 
philosophical Sanskrit texts. The two books under review, however, do deal with these 
questions, even though it is from altogether different points of view and with 
completely different results.1 It will be interesting to study them side by side. 
 A. P. Tuck's Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of Scholarship 
presents a survey of modern Någårjuna studies. The titles of three of the four chapters 
of the book leave no doubt as to the point its author wants to make. They are: 
"Nineteenth-century German idealism and its effect on second-century Indian 
Buddhism"; "Analytic India"; "Buddhism after Wittgenstein". If these titles — as well 
as some of the contents of these chapters — sound somewhat ironic, they do draw 
attention to the prejudices and presuppositions that have always influenced scholars in 
their work and are likely to continue doing to in the future. Tuck speaks in this 
connection of isogesis, which he defines as "a ‘reading into’ the text that often reveals 
as much about the interpreter as it does about the text being interpreted" (p. 9-10). 
Isogesis, Tuck further explains, is an unconscious phenomenon that is to be 
distinguished from exegesis, which is conscious intent. 
 All this is very interesting, not only for the philosopher but also for the 
philologist who studies Indian texts. The latter in particular [502] will wish to know 
how he can avoid repeating the mistakes of his predecessors. Tuck describes this 
aspiration in the following passage (p. 13): 
 
... scholars for the past two centuries have defied the isogetical nature of their 
work by attempting to put aside their own prejudices and presuppositions. By 
attending as carefully as possible to lexical questions, historical detail, and the 
accumulation of more and yet more texts to translate and interpret, they have 
created for themselves as well as for their readers, an illusion of a progressive 
increase in knowledge about Indian philosophy and of a steady accumulation of 
                                                
* Andrew P. Tuck: Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of Scholarship. On the Western interpretation of 
Någårjuna. Oxford University Press. 1990. x, 127 pp. 
Claus Oetke: Zur Methode der Analyse philosophischer SËtratexte. Die pramåˆa Passagen der NyåyasËtren. Reinbek: 
Inge Wezler. 1991. (Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik, Monographie 11.) 86 pp. 
1 For some earlier reflections on the methodology of interpreting technical Sanskrit texts, I refer to the Introduction 
of my Tradition and Argument in Classical Indian Linguistics (Reidel, Dordrecht, 1986). 
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better readings of Indian philosophical texts. The standard belief has been that 
there are more or less correct interpretations of texts and that the meaning of a 
text is recoverable if all of the necessary philological and historical research is 
carried out. Concomitant with this belief is the view that disputes between 
interpreters can be adjudicated, and that there are ways of finding ‘correct’ 
readings that are not dependent on the assumptions of the interpreter. 
Deficiencies in textual interpretation are understood to be a result of ‘an 
imperfect acquaintance with primary source materials’ and it is assumed that 
greater familiarity with original texts and the restriction of the scholar's modern 
Western biases will give us ‘accuracy’ and greater understanding of Indian 
thought. 
 
As is clear from this passage, Tuck finds this position problematic. As he points out on 
p. 15, "for contemporary Indologists to naively accept nineteenth-century objectivist 
principles betrays an ignorance of the methodological debates that have been taking 
place throughout the twentieth century in the closely related fields of literary criticism 
and post-positivistic European/American philosophy". 
 Tuck knows, then, that many contemporary Indologists — who form at least part 
of his intended readership — are ignorant of these recent debates which could yet 
seriously affect their way of working, or even convince them of the utter futility of their 
efforts. One expects therefore some arguments that support these claims, and that might 
induce the uninformed philologist to mend his ways. But no such arguments are given. 
It is true that Tuck presents some observations that are no doubt correct and valuable, 
but they in no way support his conclusions. We have seen, for example, that scholars 
"have defied the isogetical nature of their work", which seems indeed true for many of 
them. A particularly important observation is that "[t]here are no interpretations that are 
not the result of some creative effort on the part of the interpreter" (p. 15); it is this 
creative aspect of interpretation that Tuck refers to as isogetical. But from this 
observation to "the fact that knowledge can be understood only in [503] specific, 
culturally embedded forms" (p. 13) is more than an inference; it is an unsupported 
claim, and an incorrect one at that. 
 It is clear that Tuck underestimates our possibilities of understanding. We can, 
and we actually do, refine our understanding of a text by confronting it again and again 
with the principal evidence we have, viz., its exact wording. In this way we can discard 
false interpretations, which are not simply outdated with reference to the latest 
philosophical theory in vogue in the West, but really false because in contradiction with 
the exact wording of the text. By eliminating one false interpretation after the other, we 
can be sure to get ever closer to the correct interpretation of the text, even if we are to 
believe that that correct interpretation can never be fully reached. 
 Another point that has not been sufficiently appreciated by Tuck is the 
following: Scholarship is a collective enterprise, in which mutual criticism plays a vital 
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role. If one scholar is unable to break away from the patterns of thought provided by his 
culture, someone else may point out the shortcomings of his interpretation. 
 It is no coincidence that Tuck has chosen, in order to illustrate his point of view, 
the Western interpretation of Någårjuna. Någårjuna's works do not state in general 
terms what they are up to, thus leaving the interpreter the freedom to think more or less 
what he likes without running too great a risk of colliding with them.2 This does not 
necessarily imply that confrontation with the texts will never allow us to make a choice 
between these various "interpretations". In fact, Stcherbatsky and Schayer's idea that the 
Madhyamaka absolute exists, and is constituted by the whole of all there is, is an 
example to the contrary: some Madhyamaka texts say quite clearly that the absolute 
does not exist.3 Yet it should be stated that the problems connected with the 
"interpretation" of Någårjuna do not so much illustrate the difficulty of crossing a 
cultural boundary, but the difficulty of finding the opinion of an author on a subject 
about which he does not express himself. 
[504] 
 It would have been much fairer on the part of our author to study, say, the 
Western interpretation of Nyåya-Vaiße∑ika, whose texts offer, by and large, fewer 
fundamental difficulties of interpretation than Någårjuna. Tuck does mention the 
Nyåya-Vaiße∑ika school in his first chapter, where he points out that this school drew 
little attention during the days of European idealism, whereas it did evoke interest 
during the analytic period. But interest, or lack of it, is not the same as 
misinterpretation, and Tuck's description of the fluctuating preferences for different 
schools of thought in India under the influence of changing philosophical fashions in 
Europe do nothing to support his claims. Systems like Nyåya-Vaiße∑ika have offered 
relatively little resistance to interpretation, not because there are no cultural barriers 
here, but simply because the texts express themselves rather clearly about most of the 
points that interest the Western interpreter. 
 At this point I will briefly discuss an example of a text whose interpretation has 
been improved by moving away from the model suggested by modern Western thought. 
This text is the Nirukta. It deals with etymologies, according to its standard 
interpretation dating from Max Müller in the middle of the nineteenth century. No need 
to add that these etymologies were looked upon, by Max Müller as well as by his 
successors, as historical etymologies, of the same type as those provided by historical 
linguistics, and meant to throw light on the historical development of the word 
                                                
2 Compare Richard Hayes' recent observation about Någårjuna (e-mail Buddhism Discussion Group, 16th July 
1992): "Not many Indian thinkers have been capable of so many radically different styles of interpretation." He then 
wonders "what features of Någårjuna's presentation make it so difficult to interpret definitively and so easy to 
interpret in whatever way one wants. He's a bit like an oracle in whose words one can hear any message that one 
wants to hear." 
3 See Bronkhorst, 1992: 71 f. 
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concerned. The etymologies of the Nirukta were thus criticized for being "incorrect", or 
occasionally praised for being "correct". In reality these etymologies were never meant 
to elucidate the historical development of words. This becomes clear from a precise 
study of the wording of the text.4 It is confirmed by the circumstance that Indian culture 
tended to look upon its holy languages as stable, not subject to change in the course of 
time.5 Here, then, it is possible to arrive at a more correct (without quotation marks) 
interpretation of the Nirukta, which yet does not correspond to anything in modern 
Western thought. The idea of non-historical etymologies, though not unknown to an 
earlier phase of Western culture (cp. Plato's Cratylus), is completely foreign to modern 
linguistics and to any other modern school of thought. This means that this more correct 
interpretation of the Nirukta is arrived at by confronting an [505] initial interpretation 
that was provided by Western culture, with the letter of the text. This procedure 
requires, not that the scholar is aware of all his presuppositions or the like, but that he is 
willing to put question marks behind all his interpretations, especially there where a 
passage of the text does not appear to agree well with them. In the case of the Nirukta 
we have not, of course, reached the finally correct interpretation, or the original 
intentions — all of them — of its author. But only a philosophical nitpicker could deny 
that we have come a great deal closer to them. 
 If the value of this example is accepted, it is clear (i) that at least in some cases it 
is possible to get closer to the "real" meaning of a text, and (ii) that such an improved 
interpretation does not have to be inspired by ideas current in Western thought. But 
once these possibilities are admitted in principle, it becomes imperative to look for 
really better — i.e., objectively better — interpretations elsewhere, too. 
 In the Afterword to his book (p. 96 f.) Tuck warns against the extreme of 
"relativism" - the view that we are irrevocably confined to linguistic and cultural 
communities, and that real understanding cannot exist among cultures, historical 
periods, or even individuals. But "[j]ust as extreme as the relativists ... are the ordinary 
scholars who believe in unconditioned facts and objective readings of texts: the 
unwillingness to question presuppositions is as much a failure of moderation as ... the 
paralysis ... that can come from too much self-consciousness" (p. 97). 
 I must admit that I am perplexed by this passage. It obviously means that Tuck 
does not consider himself a relativist, and that he considers willingness to question 
presuppositions a requirement of good scholarship. Does this imply that Tuck, after all 
he has said, now joins the scholars of the past two centuries in "defy[ing] the isogetical 
nature of [his] work by attempting to put aside [his] own prejudices and 
presuppositions"? Or do we witness here a feeble attempt to "rescue" scholarship whose 
                                                
4 Bronkhorst, 1981; Kahrs, 1983; 1984. 
5 Bronkhorst, 1993. 
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very reason of existence had been rejected in the preceding pages? It is a fact that, when 
it comes to giving practical advice to scholars in the field, Tuck recommends them to 
continue as before. They should not however believe that they will ever find 
"knowledge" in the sense of a correct "representation of reality", that they are pursuing 
objective truth. Yet Tuck's book "is not intended to suggest that every previous attempt 
at cross-cultural philosophical study has failed" (p. 99). Unfortunately it does not tell us 
what it means for a cross-cultural study to be successful. 
[506] 
 All in all, the impression created by this book is that its author is carried away 
by some fashionable ideas of which he does not dare, when it comes to it, to draw the 
consequences. 
 
What we must retain from Comparative Philosophy ... is the observation that a creative 
effort is involved in reading a text. This important insight seems to be lacking in C. 
Oetke's Zur Methode der Analyse philosophischer SËtratexte.6 Oetke is clearly not 
interested in the hermeneutical questions that occupy Tuck; there is not a single 
reference in his book to the methodological debates that form the basis of Tuck's study. 
His problem is that of the practical philologist who is confronted with the obscurity of 
philosophical SËtra texts. There is no doubt that what he wants from these texts is their 
"real meaning" (even though he is aware of the fact that this may mean different things 
in different circumstances). Tuck's qualms about the possibility of there being a real 
meaning are not entertained. 
 The interpretation of SËtra texts, never easy, is particularly difficult in cases 
where sËtras may have been added, or removed, in the course of time. This last 
hypothesis seems the most plausible way to account for the form in which some of these 
SËtra texts have reached us. Note that this type of internal evidence is as a rule the only 
justification we have to conclude that a certain SËtra text is not the unitary creation of a 
single author. Where there are no special reasons to doubt the unitary creation of a SËtra 
text — as in the case of Påˆini's A∑†ådhyåy¥, as understood by most scholars — single 
authorship is taken for granted. This is hardly surprising: it is logically possible to doubt 
the single authorship of each and every piece of writing. Logically it is hard to exclude 
the possibility that every sentence of Oetke's book has a different author. In practice 
most readers will accept single authorship of a text that is presented to us as a unit, until 
and unless this view presents us with difficulties which an hypothesis of multiple 
authorship can more easily explain. 
                                                
6 The following observations on Oetke's book are presented with a certain reserve: Oetke's style is so difficult for me 
to read that, even after several rereadings, I am still not sure that I have correctly understood him. 
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 Oetke is clearly of a different opinion. The sËtras which engage his attention in 
this book — Nyåya SËtra (NS) 2.1.8-2.1.19 — allow of a consistent interpretation, as he 
argues esp. on p. 34-35. Yet later in the book a long discussion is dedicated to the 
possible original meanings of these sËtras, and to their relative chronology with regard 
to each other. In [507] a more general way — and here we come to the method 
announced in the title — Oetke presents the view (p. 63) that, at least in principle, first 
all possible meanings of individual sËtras should be traced and examined. Subsequently 
one should search for plausible combinations: Das Ziel wäre die Auffindung von 
Kombinationen von Interpretations-alternativen einzelner SËtras, die nach 
verschiedenen "Bewertungsparametern" gemessen insgesamt günstige 
Wahrscheinlichkeitswerte ergeben. 
 It must be admitted that Oetke's proposal constitutes a complete novelty, and 
one can only hope that it will not be followed by other workers in the field, at least not 
in this extreme form. Not only is Oetke's "atomistic" approach to the sËtras of dubious 
value. The very idea of enumerating all possible meanings of individual sËtras, which 
must then be combined, overlooks the creative element in interpreting texts: one cannot 
reduce the interpretation of a text to a mechanical enumeration of possibilities. 
 It is typical for Oetke's approach that he says a great deal about logical 
possibilities, and little about what we actually know about the history of SËtra texts. As 
noted above, we only know about modifications in SËtra texts in cases where these 
modifications have left their traces. This, together with the fact that the earliest 
commentators already choose rather to present a forced interpretation than to change the 
wording of a sËtra, suggests that sËtras were not easily changed, i.e., adjusted to a 
different situation. When, in these circumstances, Oetke enumerates on p. 47 ways in 
which older sËtras may have been incorporated satisfactorily into later works, we are in 
a realm of pure speculation, which does not become any the less speculative by the fact 
that the speculations represent logical possibilities. 
 Oetke's approach is further characterized by the extent to which he holds that 
texts should not be interpreted in the light of other texts (dass man Texte nicht im 
Lichte anderer Texte interpretieren darf/soll; p. 46). This position gives rise to a long 
discussion about the meaning of prad¥paprakåßavat 'like the light of a lamp' in sËtra 
2.1.19. 
 This comparison occurs a number of times in Indian philosophical literature of 
the period. Oetke refers, besides to NS 2.1.19, to NS 5.1.10 with Bhå∑ya, 
Vigrahavyåvartan¥ under v. 33, and Vaidalyaprakaraˆa sËtra 5. One could add 
Bhart®hari's Mahåbhå∑ya D¥pikå I p. 3 l. 20, Praßastapåda's Padårthadharmasa∫graha, 
alias Praßastapådabhå∑ya, vol. II p. 284 (ed. Gaurinath Sastri), and Någårjuna's 
MËlamadhyamakakårikå 7.8 and 12. Let us look at these passages one by one. 




 Bhart®hari introduces the comparison of the lamp in the following words: 
dvißakti˙ ßabda åtmaprakåßane 'rthaprakåßane ca samartha˙/ yathå prad¥pa˙ åtmånaµ 
prakåßayan nidhyarthån prakåßayati/ "The word has two powers: it is capable of 
illuminating itself and its meaning; like a lamp which, while illuminating itself, 
illuminates the wealth in a treasury." Praßastapåda states: yathå gha†ådi∑u prad¥påt 
[pratyayo bhavati], na tu prad¥pe prad¥påntaråt "E.g., the lamp brings about the 
cognition of the jar etc.; but no other lamp brings about the cognition of the lamp." 
MËlamadhyamakakårikå 7.8 reads: prad¥pa˙ svaparåtmånau saµprakåßayate yathå "Just 
as a lamp which illuminates itself and something else ..." The Vigrahavyåvartan¥ has: 
dyotayati svåtmånaµ yathå hutåßas tathå paråtmånam/ svaparåtmånåv evaµ 
prasådhayanti pramåˆån¥ti// "Just as a fire brightens itself and something else, so the 
means of knowledge make known themselves and other things." And the 
Vaidalyaprakaraˆa: tshad ma rnams la ni tshad ma med do/ ˙dir mar me b∑in tshad ma 
ni ra∫ da∫ g∑an sgrub par byed pa yin no/ ji ltar mar me ni ra∫ da∫ g∑an gsal bar byed pa 
mtho∫ ba de b∑in du tshad ma rnams kya∫ ra∫ da∫ g∑an sgrub par byed pa yin no// 
"(sËtra:) Means of knowledge have no means of knowledge (by which they are known). 
In this respect a means of knowledge is like a lamp: it establishes itself as well as other 
things. (Comm.:) Just as a lamp is seen to light up itself as well as other things, so do 
also means of knowledge establish themselves as well as other things." The Nyåya 
Bhå∑ya on sËtra 5.1.10 presents the same image: atha prad¥paµ did®k∑amåˆå˙ 
prad¥påntaraµ kasmån nopådadate/ antareˆåpi prad¥påntaraµ d®ßyate prad¥pa˙/ tatra 
prad¥padarßanårthaµ prad¥popådånaµ nirarthakam/ "But why don't those who wish to 
see a lamp fetch another lamp? [Because] the lamp is seen even without another lamp. 
Here it is useless to fetch a lamp in order to see another lamp." The Nyåya Bhå∑ya on 
sËtra 2.1.19, too, knows an interpretation of that sËtra that uses the same image: yathå 
prad¥paprakåßa˙ prad¥påntaraprakåßam antareˆa g®hyate tathå pramåˆåni 
pramåˆåntaram antareˆa g®hyant[e] "Just as the light of a lamp is grasped without the 
light of another lamp, so the means of knowledge are grasped without another means of 
knowledge."7 
[509] 
 NS 2.1.19, then, allows of an interpretation that uses an image known from a 
variety of texts. But here Oetke's principle that texts should not be interpreted in the 
light of other texts comes in. Oetke warns against a "gleichmacherische Tendenz" (p. 
33) and observes that "mit Verweisen auf Parallelen in anderen Texten ... sehr 
bedachtsam umgegangen werden sollte, weil damit meist nur Unterschiede verwischt 
                                                
7 Note that the author of the Nyåya Bhå∑ya prefers another interpretation of sËtra 2.1.19. Oetke is however right in 
pointing out (p. 33) that this interpretation has little to recommend itself. 
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werden und dies der ... Tendenz zur Gleichmacherei dienlich ist" (p. 40). In five pages 
(36-40) he shows that other interpretations of sËtra 2.1.19 are imaginable. Unfortunately 
no independent evidence is provided to support these other interpretations (not even 
from parallel texts). As so often, all these pages of heavy prose show no more than that 
other interpretations are logically possible. But who ever doubted this? Oetke's principle 
would obviously have been served better with one single example where he could show 
that non-observance of his principle leads (or has lead) to an incorrect interpretation. 
But clinching examples (or counter-examples) are obviously not his strong side. 
 Mention was made above of the principle that a text be accepted as a single 
whole unless there are compelling reasons to doubt this. It was also pointed out that 
Oetke does not accept this principle, at least not where SËtra texts are concerned. This 
leads to amazing pronouncements, such as the following. On p. 47 Oetke refers to the 
suspicion of Ruben and others, according to which books 2 to 4 of the Nyåya SËtra have 
been inserted later into the text. He observes that the fact that all of the Nyåya SËtra, 
including chapters 2-4, constitutes a systematic whole, is no valid argument (his words 
are: völlig unbrauchbar) against this suspicion. One wonders, of course, what kind of 
argument Oetke would consider useful to support the unitary nature and origin of a text. 
Do we have to conclude that for Oetke the non-unitary nature of, at any rate, Indian 
SËtra texts is axiomatic? 
 Oetke's methodological reflections constitute something like an appendix to a 
detailed study of Nyåya sËtras 2.1.8 - 2.1.19. He criticizes at length another 
interpretation of these sËtras, and then presents one of his own (p. 34-35). Here Oetke 
makes a remark with which one cannot but agree, and which one wishes he had heeded 
himself. This remark shows that he is, to at least some extent, aware that finding the 
meaning of a text is not a purely mechanical affair, the sole requirement for which is, 
supposedly, applying the correct method. For here he admits that in comparing 
interpretations of a text, it is the relative superiority of one over the other that counts (p. 
35: Die relative Überlegenheit ist es aber, auf die [510] es in diesem Zusammenhang 
allein ankommt). In other words, it is always possible that someone else will, in spite of 
one's best efforts, find an even better interpretation. Presenting an interpretation that can 
be corrected by others is not in itself a sign of methodological shortcomings; bad 
methodology is not responsible for Newton's failure to discover the theory of relativity. 
 Comparing interpretations is of the essence of textual scholarship. It is useless to 
criticize an interpretation if one has nothing better (or at least equivalent) to offer. Oetke 
does not seem to realize this: at the very least he would have eased the task of his 
readers considerably if he had made clear at every step that he criticizes other 
interpretations because he thinks he can offer a better one. Simply criticizing other 
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interpretations not only makes for tedious reading, it is even methodologically 
indefensible. 
 It is not possible to discuss Oetke's ideas here in further detail. One general 
observation must however be made. Whereas most philologists will see it as their task 
to interpret texts in their historical and cultural context, Oetke has the tendency to 
abstract the statements he seeks to interpret from any context whatsoever. He is 
primarily interested in logically possible interpretations, much less in interpretations 
that fit best the cultural and historical context. Such a procedure may perhaps 
occasionally rectify interpretations that have been too heavily influenced by contextual, 
at the expense of textual considerations. Unfortunately Oetke presents no example 
where this can be shown to be the case. 
 
This takes us to the contrast that exists between the two books here reviewed. In an 
important sense they represent two opposite extremes. For Tuck, there is no way to 
break away from one's own cultural universe and enter into that of the Indian authors 
whose texts we study; not even detailed textual scholarship can help us cross the barrier. 
Oetke, on the other hand, comes close to denying the very existence of such a barrier. 
Accordingly, he seeks to provide a mechanical method to get at the meaning of the text. 
In reality there is no justification, neither for Tuck's hopelessness nor for Oetke's 
methodological optimism. We can in many cases get close to the intended meaning of a 
text, yet success is not guaranteed by simply applying a supposedly right method. There 
is a creative element in reading any text, even, or especially, a sËtra. But our creativity 
is not limited, it is no prison. It can get us closer to the meaning of a text if we confront 
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